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Alison FoiTest

T H E C A N A D A / U . S . D Y N A M I C P O S T 9/11: M A I N T A I N I N G
SOVEREIGNTY, BALANCING SECURITY INTERESTS &
C I V I L L I B E R T I E S IN CANADIAN IMMIGRATION P O L I C Y MAKING

Abstract: This paper is a part o f a larger research project that looks at the balancing
of security interests and civil liberties in Canadian immigration policy-making post
9/11. The argument presented in this paper counters the frequently proposed
assertion that Canadian policy-makers are unduly influenced by U.S. policies and
politics in this area. Rather, it w i l l be argued, Canadian sovereignty is asserted
through acdve co-operation with the U.S. i n such pohcies as the Smart Border
Agreement, Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, and Safe Third Country
Agreement.
Through this active co-operation with the U.S. the Canadian
Goverrunent is able to assure the U.S. o f its ongoing commitment to security issues,
while diverting American interest from more extreme measures such as the
proposed perimeter security project.
A further argument demonstrates that the veiy different Constitutions and political
traditions o f the U.S. and Canada necessarily result i n very different responses to
the teiTorist threat. In Canada there is active public debate around the balancing o f
security interests and civil liberties, an independent judiciaiy, and independent
review agencies operating at arms'-length from the executive, while in the U.S. the
system o f constitutional checks and balances has effectively broken down. The
Canadian response to the teiTorist threat - including immigration policies - is not
perfect, but it a genuine Canadian-made product.

iii

iv

I . INTRODUCTION

This paper w i l l analyze and challenge the assertion that Canadian
immigration policy, along with security policies, post 9/11 is unquestionably
following the U.S. lead. It will argue that this perception is based in a deeprooted and long-held fear held by many Canadians that has found expression
in such polemics as George Grant's Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of
Canadian Nationalism J According to this argument, Canada is but an
outpost of American culhiral imperialism, its political hfe a puppet of U.S.
dictates, and its economy a combination of G.M. plants and American chainstores. As a result, the argument urges, Canada is no longer a sovereign state
and Canadian nationalism is a thing of the past. Grant's lament was
published in 1965 following the Cuban missile crisis, and cites the U.S. entiy
into World War I I as the begimring of the end for Canada's long-held tie and
identification with British values, and their transference to those of its
southern neighbour. Forty years after Grant's text was published and the
charge is still being made: Canada's response to post 9/11 security concerns,
alarmists urge, mirror those of the U.S. These policies are an unthinking and
reflex response to U.S. calls for heightened security against possible futm-e
terrorist tlireats, and Canadian policy-makers simply follow in the wake of
U.S. leadership.
It is true that the security regime that Canada has installed post 9/11 has done
httle to dispel these fears and anxieties. Canada's security regime looks
remarkably similar to that of the U.S.: they have the newly-formed umbrella
organization, the Department of Homeland Security, and we have the
Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness; they have the
U.S.A. Patriot Act- and Homeland Security Act of 2002^ and we have the

George Grant, Lament for a Nation: tlie Defeat of Canadian Nationalism (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart in association with the Institute of Canadian Studies, Carleton
University, 1965). See also, Richard Gwyn, Nationalism Witliout Walls: The Unbearable
Lightness of Being Canadian (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995); Seymour Martin
Lipset, North American Cultures: Values and Institutions in Canada and the U.S.,
Borderlands Monograph Series #3 (Borderlands, 1990); and, more recently, the national
bestseller by Michael Adams with Amy Langstaff and David Jamieson, Fire and Ice: the
United States, Canada and the Myth of Converging lvalues (Toronto: Penguin, 2003) that
seeks to explode this persistent myth.
' U.S.A. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
^ Homelcmd Security Act of2002.
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Anti-terrorism Act' and the Public Safety Act^; they have incorporated
immigration and refugee issues under the umbrella organization alongside
security and policing issues, and so too has Canada. Furthermore, there is
clear evidence of the desire on both side of the Canada/U.S. border to coordinate security practices between the two nations, while at the same time
facilitating the movement of people and trade cross-border. Two recent
statements pointing to this mutual desire make this clear. The first was
issued in a news release from the Hon. Mr. Martin, Prime Minister o f
Canada's office, dated November 30, 2004, "Joint Statement by Canada and
the United States on common security, common prosperity: A new
partnership in North America" following President George W. Bush's
meeting with the Hon. Paul Marfin.'' The news release speaks to this "new
partnership" as providing "improv[ed] co-ordinafion o f intelhgence-sharing,
cross-border law enforcement and counter-terrorism" in the effort "to protect
our citizens and promote democracy, human rights, prosperity, economic
opportunities, and the quality o f life". ' And, second, this "joint approach to
partnerships, consensus standards, and smarter regulations"** was reiterated
and built upon most recently in March 2005 following the meeting of Prime
Minister Martin with U.S. President George W. Bush and Mexican President
Vicente Fox at Baylor University in Waco, Texas. The news release,
"Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America Established" issued
from this meeting signaled the intent to extend this partnership across North
America to include Mexico. The publication of an interim report by the
Canadian federal govemment's Policy Research Initiative last December,
"Canada-U.S. Regulatory co-operation: Charting a Path Fomard", part of its
broader North American Linlcages programme, and urging greater regulatory
co-operation between Canada and the U.S. further underscores the move in

' Anti-terrorism Act, 2001, c.4I.
' Public Safety Act 2002, 2004, c-15.
News Release, "Joint statement by Canada and the United States on common security,
common prosperity: A new partnership in North America", Office of the Prime Minister,
November 30, 2004, Ottawa, website, http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=341.
' News Release, "Joint statement by Canada and the United States on common security,
common prosperity: A new partnership in North America", Office of the Prime Minister,
November 30, 2004, Ottawa, website, htt]?://pm.gc.ca/eng/iiews.asp?id=341 at I .
Ibid, at 2.

2005]

T H E C A N A D A / U S D Y N A M I C POST 9/11

3

this direction.' This co-operation would see Canada and the U.S. develop
similar regulations in order to facilitate trade.
Some of the paranoia generated by the overt steps o f Canada towards these
closer relations with the U.S. - and Mexico - derive (again) from longstanding concems that the N A F T A treaty signals the end of Canadian
sovereignty.'" Many Canadians feel that the fear of terrorism has supplied
the opportunity for precipitating and accelerating ties - especially economic
and political ties - with the U.S.: the same close relationship advocated by
an earher generation of political conservatives such as the C D . Howe
Institute, and now heard again."
Policies such as the Safe Third Countiy Agreement signed by Canada and
the U.S. bring into play issues of national sovereignty and fear of U.S.
influence in domestic policies and politics. Their insertion in the heart o f
security interests on both sides of the border necessarily raises a red flag.
Immigration (and refugee) policies are an important aspect of determining a
nation's identity: they determine who is ' i n ' and who is 'out'. Hence, by
their very nature these pohcies are highly political. And in a post 9/11
reorganized government stmcture where these policies sit alongside security
and policing matters, their political nature is even more apparent. Catherine
Dauvergne reflects on this political nature of immigration and refugee laws
in the following way:

' "Canada-US Regulatory Co-operation: Charting a Path Forward", Policy Research
Initiative Canada, Interim Report, PRI Project, North American Linkages, December 2004.
Newspaper articles such as that of the Globe & Mail's April 6, 2005 article, "Possible
U.S. ambassador to Canada close with Bush" underscore these concerns page (AI3). The
article discusses the front-mnner to the position of U.S. ambassador to Canada, David
Wilkins, as knowing little about Canada or for that matter international or trade relations,
but as being essentially a political appointee (as is typical of these appointments) rather than
a career diplomat. His close relations with the Bush family is discussed extensively and the
message is clear: this is yet another way to forge closer ties between the U.S. and Canada.
Furthermore, statements such as those made by the Hon. Irwin Cotler in an article discussing
Bill C-36, the Anti-terrorism Act, emphasize the differences between the U.S. and Canada
only seem to erode confidence in Canadian independence, rather than assert an argument in
support of it: "Terrorism, Security and Rights: the Dilemma of Democracies", (2002) 14.1
National Journal of Constitutional Law, pp. 55ff.
" See, for example, Alan S. Alexandroff and Don Guy, "What Canadians Have to Say
About Relations With the United States", C D . Howe Institute Backgrounder, Border
Papers, No. 73, July 2003 <www.cdhowe.org>
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We define ourselves through our immigration law, more than
through any other legal text, including our citizenship law
and our constitution. With this law we bring into existence
the group for whom the constitution is then interpreted and
infijsed with meaning, as well as the eligibility group of
potential new citizens.'^

Dauvergne goes on to explain how these policies create a national border
and, in so doing, constitute the nation and national interest;
In order for the nation to exist, for there to be a community,
there must be a boundaiy
Although the border "exists" as
an image on a map, what makes it meaningful are the legal
texts that protect and defend it. Immigration law is not the
only law involved here, but it is the key one when people
rather than things or money are crossing borders. One reason
why the concept of "national interest" is so vital to
immigration law is because of the role this law plays in
constituting the nation. A principal function of immigration
law is to establish the conditions under which there can be a
national interest.'^
It is this drawing of a boundary, of demarcation, of national interest that
makes immigration law and all matters pertaining to immigration law so
highly contested, especially post 9/11. Immigration law and pohcy speak to
a nation's, Canada's, ability to define itself and to assert its sovereignty as a
nation.
But does this all necessarily add up to the loss of Canadian sovereignty, the
end of Canadian nationalism? This paper w i l l argue that it does not. The
concerns expressed are valid concerns, but they do not signal the end o f
Canadian values. They speak rather to the Canadian commitment to open

'•^ Catherine Dauvergne, "Evakiating
Act in Its Global Contexf, December,
Catherine Dauvergne, "Evaluating
Act in Its Global Contexf, December,

Canada's New Immigration and Refugee Protection
2003, 41 Alberta L. Rev. 725 at 741.
Canada's New Immigration and Refugee Protection
2003, 41 Alberta L. Rev. 725 at 741.
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debate around issues of such national importance as Canada's immigration
and trade pohcies, its newly developed security measures post 9/11, and the
concems these security measures have precipitated, in their turn, that the end
result w i l l mean the compromising of human rights. This paper w i l l argue
that Canada's continuing independence from the U.S. derives from its very
different political and social history, and the traditions and institutions that
support it. Foremost amongst these institutions lies our Westminster system
of govemment. It w i l l be further argued that this very different system of
government - including an activist, independent final court of appeal, the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and decisions based on it, a system of
independent review agencies operating at arms-length from the executive ~
and the political culture that incorporates a dynamic and genuine dialogue
between the government and those governed, aU support the contention that
Canada continues to follow its own lead in responding to the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, and not those of the U.S. The paper proposes to demonstrate these
contentions by focusing on the following: (1) the different constitutional
sh'ucture and political traditions of the U.S. and Canada; (2) an independent
judiciaiy that draws upon the Charter, international case law and
intemational human rights conventions; and (3) strategic reasons for (some)
closer Canada-U.S. ties.
I I . C H E C K S AND BALANCES: T H E U . S . AND CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONS

The United States has a republican constitution and Canada a parliamentaiy
constitution. As a recently pubhshed consultation paper issued by Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada notes, this difference has
important implications to the application of national security measures.'''
Any discussion of US arrangements for review of security
matters needs to take account o f the radically different
constitutional arrangements for govemment in that country.
The United States is a republic with a system of government
based on the separation of powers, unlike the Westminster
systems, which are based on the responsibility of the

" A National Security Committee of Parliamentarians", A Consultation Paper to Help
Inform the Creation of a Committee of Parliamentarians to Review National Security, Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, Ottawa 2004, http://w\vw.psepcsppccKCca/publications/national security/nat sec cmte e.asp at 10.
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government and its fiision with legislature in the institution of
Parliament.
This means that in the United States the
government is shared between the executive and the
legislature, unlike in the Westminster system, where the
government governs and is accountable to the legislature for
its stewardship.
These constitutional differences have consequences.
Congress does not review the actions o f security and
intelligence agencies, it has oversight of them. Congress
works with the executive branch to regulate the operational
agencies, giving approval for matters that in Westminster
governments fall clearly under the responsibility of ministers.
There is even provision for select leaders in Congress to be
consulted about proposed covert activities.'-"^
As the consultation paper concludes, the Australian, New Zealand and
United Kingdom experiences are more pertinent to Canada than that of the
United States:
There is a remarkable degree of similarity in the evolution of
Parliament's role in respect of national security over the past
twenty years in Australia, New Zealand and the United
Kingdom. Those similarities extend no less to Canada. The
experience of the United States has been considerably
different, reflecting the fimdamental differences between the
republican and parliamentaiy constitutional systems and
experiences, including the absence from the US system of
independent review agencies operating at arms'-length from
the executive. Moreover, the obligations o f the President to
provide information, and of the Congressional committees to
oversee intelligence matters add up to much more than a

" A National Security Committee of Parliamentarians", A Consultation Paper to Help
Inform the Creation of a Committee of Parliamentarians to Review National Security, Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, Ottawa 2004, http://www.pse)3csppcc.gc.ca/publications/national security/nat sec cmte e.asp at 10. Italics in text.
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review fimction, reflecting the very diflierent constitufional
arrangements in the United States."'
The Hon. Irwin Cotler, in commenting on the difference between the U.S.
and Canadian security measures post 9/11, notes that "U.S. anti-terrorist
measures have undermined fimdamental human rights principles and
protections that have characterized the American constitution for more than
200 years..."" The first two principles he lists are the "separation of powers
principles with its attendant checks and balances" and the "open government
principle - of the people, for the people, by the people."'** Cofier argues that
the first of these principles, the separation of powers, is based on a
supposition of "diffusion of power amongst the three branches of
government" which includes the sharing of information such that each
branch can monitor the other two, and the constitutional boundaries between
them are respected." This system of mutual monitoring and respect for
boundaries has broken down, he argues, as a result of the executive's refusal
to share information with the other two branches of govemment, "including
the witliholding of infonnation from congressional oversight committees",'"
as weh as the withholding of "relevant information from the judiciary.""
The second constihitional principle to be violated by the U.S. government's
anti-terrorist measures - the open government principle (of the people, for
the people, by the people). Coder states, is founded in the U.S. Constitution's
presupposition of "the vigilance of an informed citizemy as the ultimate
check on arbitrary government and the guarantee of democratic
government.'"' In support o f this, two statutes were passed: the Freedom of
Information Act'' and the Whistlebhwer
Protection Act.''
However, one
month after the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. Attorney General Jolm Ashcroft
encouraged "the presumptive refusal of requests for information" in a
memorandum sent out to all federal departments, whether or not they had

''ibid, at I I .
' I r w i n Cotler, "Terrorism, Security and Rights" 14 NJCL at 56.
''Ibid.
" Irwin Cotler, "Terrorism, Security and Rights" 14 NJCL at 57.
"fbid.
" Ibid.
"Ibid.
" Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. &552 (1966) [hereinafter FOI Act)
" WImdeblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. & 2303. II)icI at 57.
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any relation to security i s s u e s . A s Cotler notes, this move is a direct
reversal of the i^O/'s presumption that eveiy citizen has a ''right to access
government infonnation."^
I I . 1 DIFFERENT CONSTITUTIONS/DIFFERENT POLITICAL TRADITIONS

A h of this is not to say that Canada's record in the application of security
measures post 9 / 1 1 is exemplary. It is just different from that o f the United
States. A n d this difference speaks to the different Constitutions of the two
countries that allow for such astonishing constitutional violations on the part
of the executive in the U.S. that have not occurred in Canada. These same
constitutional violations, I would argue, have not and cannot occur in Canada
with its veiy different Constitution, and the checks and balances this
Constitution entails.
Likewise, the strong tradition of democratic
participation of the Canadian people appears to work in this country in a way
that it does not south of the border. One example, as Ronald J. Daniels notes
in the introduction to the text, is the publication of The Security of Freedom:
Essays on Canada's Anti-Terrorism Bid'' which was produced following a
two-day public conference held to debate B i h C-36 {Anti-terrorism
Bill).
Daniels describes the essays as:
[Ijmportant contributions to the very necessaiy democratic
debate about B i l l C-36. This robust democratic process
honours our free and democratic society and distinguishes it
from those who would use violence and weapons, not essays
and speeches, for political ends. The commentators in this
book have brought their varied expertise, experience and
perspectives to bear on the many parts of the govemment's
omnibus bill in an incredibly short time.
They have
discharged their duties as both citizens and academics in a
most admirable way.
I am very proud to have been
associated with the collective effort necessaiy to produce
such leamed and thoughtful commentary that can contribute

Invin Cotler, "Terrorism, Security and Rights" 14 NJCL at 57. Italics appear in text.
Ibid. Italics in text.
" Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Maklem, and Kent Roach, eds.. The Security of Freedom:
Essays on Canada's Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
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so directly to debates that are fundamental to both our
security and our freedom.''
This open and public debate is certainly at odds with the lack of information
given citizens in the U.S., as noted by Cotler, above.'' And it is at odds with
the fact that the U.S. Patriot Act was enacted "without debate or discussion,
either in the congressional arena or amongst the public.""'" The enactment of
the American Legislature was "without public hearings or witness
testimonies", by contrast with the Canadian process-" that saw the
engagement with security issues by academics, civil libertarian groups and
NGOs, minority interest groups, newspaper articles and commentai-y, and
other media, all speak to a strong commitment to, and practice of, democratic
government.
I I . 2 C I V I L LIBERTIES

Kate Martin similarly describes the U.S. in her contribution to the collection.
Terrorism, Law, and Democracy: How is Canada Changing
following
September IIT' She argues that many of the security measures implemented
by the U.S. in response to 9/11 "have the effect of concentrating power i n the
hands of the executive branch of the Govei-nment, while diminishing its
accountability to the legislature, the judiciary and the public."-'^ This
together with the secrecy under which govenmient action occurs excludes
the public from knowledge of government action. This is a cause for
concern. These government directives are generated by the Patriot Act and
include inadequate due process protection of detained immigrants such that
standards are not set out for the Attorney General " i n making and reviewing

''Ibid, at \%.
" This is not to suggest that the U.S. Iacl<s public debate on these important matters, or that
the Canadian public has unfettered access to highly sensitive government information, but
suggests, rather, that the difference lies in a matter of degree of openness: Canada's debate
takes place in a tradition of openness, while the U.S. has adopted one of secrecy.
Irwin Cotler, "Terrorism, Security and Rights" 14 A^CL at 67.
''Ibid
" Kate Martin, "Civil Liberties and the U.S. Government Response to September I I " , in
Terrorism, Law, and Democracy: How is Canada Changing following September III
published by the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, Montreal: Les Editions
Themes Inc., 2002), at 8 I f f
"ibid, at'&\.
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the decisions to certify an individual as a suspected terrorist" and likewise
does not "provide guidance to the courts on what evidence it should consider
in assuming the justification of the Attorney General's decision or whether
the detainees w i l l have access to the evidence on which such decisions are
b a s e d . F u r t h e r m o r e , an order issued by the Attorney General under the
authority of the Patriot Act directed the Justice Department "to monitor the
conversations between individuals being detained by the Government and
their lawyers i f the Attorney deemed them ten-orists.^^ As Martin notes, this
monitoring undermines the confidential lawyer-client relations so violating
detainees' First Amendment right to access the courts, their Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance to counsel, and the Fourth
Amendment when it violates federal wiretapping statutes.
Due process rights were abrogated when over one thousand individuals were
placed in secret detention by the U.S. Administration immediately following
9/11, and the Justice Department refused to make public the names of those
arrested.^'' Only after congressional and public pressure did the Justice
Department release the names of those charged with federal crimes." As a
result, a court case has been filed under the FOI Act by the Center for
National Security Studies and others.^** This further bolsters public concerns
that the Government has abandoned the constitutional requirements that "an
individual may only be arrested when there is probable cause to believe he is
engaged in criminal activity", but now seeks to jail individuals until F B I
clearance is achieved."
A further violation of First Amendment rights is alleged by the in camera
proceedings of all immigration cases where individuals were secretly

Kate Martin, "Civil Liberties and the U.S. Govermnent Response to September 11", in
Terrorism, Law, and Democracy: How is Canada Clianging following September 111
published by the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, Montreal: Les Editions
Themes Inc., 2002) at 84.
''Ibid,
''ibid, at 85.
"Jbid.
"ibid. See 5 U.S.C. & 552.
" Kate Martin, "Civil Liberties and the U.S. Government Response to September 11", in
Terrorism, Law, cmdDemocracy: How is Canada Changing following September 111
Published by the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, Montreal: Les Editions
Themes Inc., 2002) at 87.
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arrested in comiection with terrorist investigation by order of the Attorney
General.'"' Again, court cases alleging a violation o f due process rights have
emerged from this decision. Finally, President Bush issued a Military Order
authorizing the creation of mihtaiy commissions to try non-citizens alleged
to be involved in international terrorism against the U.S., and authorizing the
indefinite detention o f non-citizens deemed terrorists.'" This order was
criticized as violating the International
Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights that guarantees a trial by an independent and impartial tribunal.'" The
order was further criticized as being outside the President's constitutional
authority: it set up military tribunals, rather than authorizing trials of
suspected terrorists by existing military courts martial.''^ And militaiy
tribunals, like the civilian court system, involve judicial power that,
according to the Constitution, is vested in the Supreme Court and such
inferior courts created by Congress. A military tribunal, then, can only be
authorized by the Constitiition or by Congress, and not by the President.''''
The Military Order fiirther violates many basic due process rights including
the right to be presumed innocent, allowing evidence that would not be
allowed in civilian courts, government authority to use secret evidence in
some instances that it would not even be required to show to judges, and so
on.''-'^ Additionally, there would also be a presumption of secrecy, in contrast
to the constitutionally mandated open judiciary.""*
n.3 INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY OR 'MERE ERRAND B O Y ' ?

A n important effect of the breakdown in checks and balances in the U.S.
government is the intrasion o f the executive in the judiciary whereby (1) the
executive is involved in directing judicial decision-making, and (2) the
judiciary displays a high degree of deference to the executive in foreign
affairs. Beth Stephens explores this phenomenon in the U.S. in her 2004

/6/c/. at88.
"" Authorized November 13, 2001. Ibid, at 89.
'' Ibid, at 90.
''ibid
"ibid.
' ' Kate Martin, "Civil Liberties and the U.S. Government Response to September 11", in
Terrorism, Law, and Democracy: How is Canada Changing following September 117
Published by the Canadian InstitiUe for the Administration of Justice, Montreal: Les Editions
Themes Inc., 2002) at 91.
"ibid
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article, "Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration's Efforts
to Limit Human Rights Litigation.'"" Stephens argues that this has had a
negative impact on human rights litigation. This has occurred in the
following way:
The administration of President George W. Bush has
launched a concerted effort to overturn a groundbreaking hne
of cases, established under the Filartiga doctrine, permitting
human rights litigation in U.S. courts. Relying on the Alien
Tort Claims Act (ATCA), the Filartiga doctrine authorizes
victims of egregious human rights abuses to seek damages in
U.S. federal courts through civil lawsuits. These human
rights lawsuits contribute to the worldwide movement for
accountability by exposing abuses committed by private
individuals, corporations and govermnent officials, and by
compensating victims.'"*
The earlier Carter and Clinton administrations supported the Filartiga''^
doctrine. However, the Bush administration has "strenuously opposed
human rights litigation, intervening in a dozen cases to challenge both the
modern interpretation of the ACTA and its application in particular cases."'"
This has been justified on the basis that judicial review of gross human rights
cases "constitutes an unconstitutional interference with executive branch
foreign affairs powers."" Furthermore, the U.S. government has insisted that
the judiciary refi-ain from judicial review whenever it asserts that foreign
policy would be harmed tlnough litigation."
Stephens cites Justice
Douglas's warning made over thirty years ago, that to allow the executive
"unfettered power to detennine when litigation must be dismissed on foreign
policy grounds... would render the court "a mere eiTand boy for the
Executive Branch which may choose to pick some people's chestnuts from

Beth Stephens, "Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration's Efforts to
Limit Human Rights Litigation", Spring 2004, 17 Harv. Hum. Rt.^. J. 169.
''Ibid, at 169.
'" Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
'" Beth Stephens, "Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration's Efforts to
Limit Human Rights Litigation", Spring 2004, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 169.
'[Ibid
" Beth Stephens, "Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration's Efforts to
Limit Human Rights Litigation", Spring 2004, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. at 169-170.
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the fire, but not others.""" She states that although the Constitution gives
the President and Congress the leading roles i n foreign affairs, judicial
review of foreign affairs cases is not prohibited.'"' The division o f foreign
affairs powers, as currently practiced by the Bush administration, clearly
opposes the Constitutional assignation of powers and duties among the thi-ee
branches of government, to the detriment of judicial independence.
Concerns with judicial deference to government decision-making are
certainly not unheard of in Canada. We saw these concerns expressed in
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigrationf^
This case
involved a Tamil of Sri Lanka who was recognized as a Convention refugee
by the IRB, and apphed for landing under the Immigration Act. The Solicitor
General issued a certificate alleging the applicant was inadmissible under the
Act, and was a fundraiser for a terrorist organization. The Minister issued a
danger opinion under the Act and the applicant challenged this under s.7
Charter, the right to life, liberty and security:
s.7 Everyone has the rights to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.'*
The appeal asked the Supreme Court of Canada to consider a number of
issues: (1) the standard of review to be applied in a Minister's deportation
order; (2) i f the Charter precludes deportation where torture or death may
await a refugee; (3) i f deportation based on "mere membership" of an alleged
terrorist organization unjustifiably infringes the Charter rights of freedom of
expression and freedom of association; (4) whether the temis "terrorism" and
"danger to the security of Canada" are unconstitutionally vague; (5) whether
adequate procedural safeguards exist in the deportation scheme such that

' Ibid, at 170. Quoting Douglas J. from Fir.st Nal 7 City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
406 U.S. 759, 773 (1972), Douglas J. concurring.

'Ubid
" Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS
4; 2002 SCCl [hereinafter ^//reiV?].
"' Charter s. 7, Suresh. The applicant was able to do this following the SCC decision Singh
V. Minister of Employment and Jmnugration, [1985] 1 SCR 177 that stands for the
proposition that non-Canadians as well as Canadian citizens are protected by s.7 Charter
rights. What this means is that a non-Canadian may cite the right to life, liberty and security
in making a case against a deportation order, amongst other things.
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adequate procedural safeguards exist to ensure refugees are not deported to
risk torture or death."
The Court went on to outline the meaning and importance of these issues:
The issues engage concerns and values fundamental to
Canada and indeed the world. On the one hand stands the
manifest evil o f terrorism and the random and arbitrary
taking of iimocent lives, rippling out i n an ever-widening
spiral of loss and fear. Governments, expressing the w i l l of
the governed, need the legal tools to effectively meet this
challenge.
On the other hand stands the need to ensure that those
legal tools do not undermine values that are fundamental to
our democratic society - liberty, the mle of law, and the
principles of fimdamental justice - values that lie at the heart
of the Canadian constitutional order and the international
instmments that Canada has signed. In the end, it would be a
Pyrrhic victoiy i f terrorism were defeated at the cost of
sacrificing our commitment to those values. Parliament's
challenge is to draft laws that effectively combat teiTorism
and conform to the requirements of our Constitution and our
intemational commitments.'**
The Court concluded that:
...to deport a refugee to face a substantial risk of torture
would generally violate s.7 of the Charter. The Minister
must exercise her discretion to deport under the Immigration
Act accordingly. Properly applied, the legislation conforms
to the Charter. We reject the arguments that the terms
"danger to the security of Canada" and "teiTorism" are
unconstitutionally vague and that ss. 19 and 53(1 )(b) of the
Act violate the Charter guarantees of free expression and free

'" Suresh. at para 2.
'^''* Suresh. at paras 3 and 4.
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association, and conclude that the Act's impugned
procedures, properly followed, are constitutional.''
Applying these findings to the case at bar, the Court found, however, that
Suresh made a prima facie case o f substantia] risk of torture i f deported to
Sri Lanka, and his hearing was found not to have provided the procedural
safeguards required to protect his right not to be expelled to a risk of torhire
or death.''" The result was that Suresh was to remain in Canada until a new
hearing was heard.
Suresh stands for the finding that the right not to be deported i f toiture is
likely to take place is not unequivocal under Canadian case law. Some
critics feel that this case allowed undue deference by the judiciary in
government decision-making around security issues. They urge a stronger
message, an unequivocal message, be given in support of human rights in
these instances such that Canada would not deport a ten'orist to a country to
face toiture or death. However, this decision results from another form of
deference from that shown by the U.S. judiciary where the executive dictated
the results of human rights litigation or simply removed cases from the
agenda on the grounds of risk to the conduct o f foreign affairs. The
Canadian judiciaiy continues to work independently of the other branches of
government, even i f Canadian do not always agree with the decisions
rendered by the court, and it continues to maintain its right to do so.
As we have seen, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms plays a key
role in ensuring a balance is struck between the government's mandate to
implement security measures and the upholding of civil liberties. A n
independent court plays an important part in this. Stanley A. Cohen
elaborates on the role of the court and the Charter in his article, "Safeguards
in and Justifications for Canada's New Anti-terrorism Acf',*' arguing that
the "values [the Charter] espouses are fimdamental and should not be
denigrated. It has made a difference to [the Anti-terrorism Act] and to the
process that produced it.'"'' Cohen fiirther argues that the Supreme Court of
Canada "has recast the nUe of law as now embodying a "culhire of

''ibid, at para 5.
''" Ibid at para 6.
Stanley A. Cohen, "Canada's New Anti-Terrorism Act", (2003) 14.1 N.J.C.L. 99.
" Ibid, at 100-101.
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justification" under the Charter/'^
Govemment legislation, including
security measures, must meet Charter challenges face-on. Such legislation
must meet a Charter test for balancing security interests against other rights.
And, in the process, the court has a solid history of looking to intemational
courts and to intemational human rights treaties and conventions in reaching
a decision. This is a far cry from the court described in Stephens' article,
above,
I I . 4 C A N A D I A N SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION

The constitutional differences and different political traditions between the
two countries may be aclcnowledged, but the similarities between U,S, and
Canadian security measures that we noted earher - legislation and increasing
co-ordination and cooperation o f cross-border regulatory measures - appear
to mock this difference, Reg Whitaker offers an insightful perspective on
reconciling these apparent contradictions in his article, "Keeping Up With
The Neighbours? Canadian Responses to 9/11 in Historical and Comparative
Context.'""* As the title o f his article suggests, placing the events post 9/11 in
historical perspective offers some insight into Canadian policy-making and
what this means for Canada/U.S. relations. Whitaker argues that the
Canadian response post 9/11 is not to be regarded as an aberration in
Canadian pohcy-making, or as an indication of Canada mindlessly foUowing
U.S, lead, but rather should be viewed as an ongoing Canadian strategy to
protect Canadian sovereignty and economic security from the unintended
consequences of U,S, actions.'''
Whitaker provides the following two examples to demonstrate that Canada
has a previous history of negotiating internal and external pressures to
effectively deal with teiTorist threats, and the measures that it has deemed
necessary to quash them.*'' As evidence of this, he points to Canada's

Ibid, at 101.
'*' Reg Whitaker, "Keeping up with the Neighbours? Canadian Responses to 9/11 in
Historical and Comparative Context", Summer/Fall 2004, 41 Osgoode HaU L.J. 241,
' ' As Canada's major trading partner, economic/trading issues are necessarily of crucial
importance in government concerns with U,S. relations.
Stanley Cohen, however, disagrees strongly with the view expressed here and elsewhere,
that Bill C-36 can be compared with the War Measures Act and the Canadian government's
response to the FLQ, He urges that Bill C-36 is a gentler and kinder form of legislation with
built in checks and balances that were missing from the War Measures Act, and that it is
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experience in the Cold War where the War Measures Act was engaged and
civil liberties compromised. A further example is cited in the October 1970
crisis when "Canada faced its worst internal security crisis, when calls of the
violent separatist group, Le Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) kidnapped
the British Trade Commissioner, James Cross, and kidnapped and later
murdered the Quebec Minister of Labour, Pierre Laporte."" Once again, the
government invoked the War Measures Act citing charges of apprehended
insurrection, and the federal govemment placed Quebec under, Whitaker
argues, "what amounted to a state of martial law."*** These powers involved
the extensive use of the "power to detain and interrogate without charge,
without counsel, and without habeas corpus." In addition, the media were
censored and the FLQ declared a bamied organization, while affdiation with
the organization was banned and such affdiation made retroactive.*"' These
were very much Canadian responses.
Retuming to the events of post 9/11, Whitaker urges that the Canadian
response may be seen to work on two fronts: (1) Canada reassures its allies
of fulfdling its obligation to counter teiTorism while also reassuring its
citizens of ensuring their safety and (2) "damage limitation" whereby
Canada's economic interests remain unhamied through its participation in
security on the Canada/U.S. border. The latter front operates so as to
"reassure the United States sufficiently on border security so that commercial
traffic can be maintained, while not surrendering a critical degree of
Canadian sovereignty in the process."™ This has involved "more resources
for security and intelligence; a streamlined decision-making stmcture within
the federal government at both the political and bureaucratic levels; new and
expanded legal powers for anti-terrorist law enforcement and investigation;
and closer coordination and sharing of information with allies."" Further
initiatives have been deemed necessary, however. These include the Smart

furtlier misleading to treat them as of the same ilk. See Stanley A. Cohen, "Canada's New
Anti-Terrorism A c f , (2003) 14.1 N.J.C.L. at 100.
' ' Reg Whitaker, "Keeping up with the Neighbours? Canadian Responses to 9/11 in
Historical and Comparative Context", Summer/Fall 2004, 41 Osgoode HaU L.J. at 249.

'Ubid
''Ibid
™ Reg Whitaker, "Keeping up with the Neighbours? Canadian Responses to 9/11 in
Historical and Comparative Context", Summer/Fall 2004, 41 Osgoode HaU L.J. at 254.
" Ibid.
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Border Agreements whereby U.S.-Canada cooperation allows for the preclearance o f container traffic, the fast-tracking of safe persons and goods, the
collection of data on persons crossing the border, high-tech sui-veillance, and
expanded Integrated Border Enforcement Teams.'' Finally, the Safe Third
Country Agreement was implemented in order to reduce the movement of
refiigees across the border."
Whitaker discusses this balancing act as a deliberate process whereby the
Canadian govermnent has shown "considerable skill and adroitness" of a
"volatile process", cifing the ongoing references to Canada as a U.S. security
breach as illustration of this point.''' A l l of this, he urges, has been in an
effort by the Canadian govemment to:
[tiy] to avoid being trapped into sweeping negotiations in a
mega-agreement over a Fortress North America - such as the
perimeter security project proffered by Paul Cellucci, the
United States Ambassador to Canada, just after 9/11 (and
endorsed by a number of provincial premiers, the Official
Opposifion in Ottawa, and the influential Council of
Canadian Chief Executives.
Instead, the Canadian
government has engaged the Americans in a series of
incremental negotiations, segmented but linlced, the
successfiil outcome of which have had the cumulative effect
of mollifying American security concerns, while keeping the
flow of cross-border commerce more or less intact.
Absorbed in the specifics, the U.S. negotiators have lost sight
of the larger picture, which is exactly to the taste of the
Canadian negotiators who wished to minimize the larger loss
of sovereignty necessarily entailed in any grander, macrolevel integration and harmonization project.''
Canada is left free to pursue security (and, by extension, immigration)
legislation and to find judicial decisions consistent with its constitution and

''ibid, at255.
"ibid
'fbid
" Reg Whitaker, "Keeping up with the Neighbours? Canadian Responses to 9/11 in
Historical and Comparative Context", Summer/Fall 2004, 41 Osgoode HaU L.J. at 254.
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political and social mores, while satisfying the U.S. that it is cooperating
fully on cross-border issues.

III. CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to demonstrate that Canada's ability to determine its
own security and immigration policies post 9/11 remains unfettered by
meaningful U.S. influence. The two countries have different constitutions
and political traditions, and these have played out in veiy different ways post
9/11. While the U.S. post 9/11 has an overly powerful executive that
intrudes on the judiciaiy and legislature and has developed a culture of
secrecy, Canada straggles to work tiirough democratic and constitutional
solutions to the same problems.
The iixational fear that the Canadian government unthinkingly follows and
emulates U.S. security - and immigration - practices is a part of what has
been temed the "culture of security", which barkens back to Grant's lament
for a nation lost, h i this post 9/11 "culture of security" we must be wary of
being drawn into thinlcing that divides the world into good and evil.'*
Canadians need not fear the U.S. and its response to the tlireat of teiTorism,
as they do the threat of teiTorism itself what they need is an intelligent
response to both. As Stephen J. Toope argues of teiTorism, "Although
teiTorism must be fought strenuously, the fight must be intelligent and should
not sacrifice the veiy values that we purportedly defend."" Likewise, Canada
needs to respond to the tlireat of terrorism, as well as the U.S. attack on
terrorism, in an intelligent and thoughtfiil way. It is this ability to see all
shades of grey that w i l l ahow us to continue to work towards a balancing of
security interests and civil liberties in a way that is in keeping with Canadian
values.

Stanley A. Cohen, "Canada's New Anti-Terrorism Act", (2003) 14.1 N.J.C.L. at 281.
''Ibid.

